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COCKPIT RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AT USAIR
Dr. Robert Sellards
USAir
This paper deals with the current USAir CRM program and combines the lessons
learned and the program issues.
CURRICULUM
The training material was developed after an extensive literature search and pilot
interview survey to determine the problem. The USAir program began in 1979. The
problem was identified as a large number of accidents involving the *human factor" and
_uman performance/interaction" as key variables. This problem was not unique to any
one airline but to the whole industry, including the military. There is much research to
identify the issue and I will not cover that data at this time--suffice it to say that
extensive research was done to ensure there was a problem with a pilot's behavior and
the interaction with the environment, or another person, in a negative manner, and the
result was a loss of life.
The investigation led to the design, implementation, and evaluation of a behavioral
science awareness training program. The need was found, and the target population was
identified as the pilot group.
Problems in the human factor interface with accidents were identified which
impacted on curriculum selection. Some of these were fatigue, boredom, disorientation,
preoccupation with personal problems, attitudes, misreading instruments, interpersonal
communication with crew members, misunderstanding communication at all levels,
language barriers, judgement, decision-making, personal pathology, lack of assertiveness,
incorrect assumptions, authority problems, trust of crew members, discipline, leadership,
role dilemmas, inadequate planning, workload, equipment interaction, physical and
psychological stress, and many more. The resultant research came up with a two and a
three day program (depending on training days available).
The program has been evaluated and reevaluated over time. A research survey
instrument is used at the beginning of each session to evaluate the amount of knowledge
a pilot has about each subject presented. The instrument also calls for each pilot to give
input on problems encountered, expected, whether the pilot feels a need for training, and
what that training should include. Another instrument has been utilized at the end of
each session (all surveys are anonymous) to evaluate the pilots perception of the training
and its effectiveness. This material is used to constantly add or subtract subjects as
feedback dictates.
In 1985 a survey was sent to graduates who received training in the 1980-1982
time-frame to obtain feedback on applicability, effectiveness, and retainability of subject
matter. This research is ongoing and will be mentioned later. This feedback has also
291
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19870013226 2020-03-20T10:34:38+00:00Z
dictatedcurriculumchanges.
The intent of the program has been guided by the fact that the pilot who has the
accident/incident (pilot error) is someone who has either:
o Personality problems and/or pathology,
o Interpersonal skill/communication problems,
o Inability to control environmental variables for whatever reason, or
o Physical problems.
This is keeping in mind the fact that the technical malfunction of the aircraft may or
may not be separate from these identified problem areas. The long laundry-list of
problems will fall under these categories in some way.
All of the above mentioned issues and research guided the curriculum to include the
following subjects:
1. Incident/accident case studies.
2. Personality theories.
3. Leadership theories.
4. Stress self-assessment tests.
5. Leadership assessment tests.
6. Human development theories.
7. Personality profile inventory tests.
8. Substance abuse.
9. ASRS, NASA, NTSB, and FAA data discussions.
10. Captain, FO, Engr. and other crew roles.
ll. Diet, sleep, circadian factors, and physiology assessment.
Some other very important components of the curriculum are discussions on the
following subjects:
1. Internally-/externally-driven individuals.
2. Personality/attitude discussions.
3. Technical/non-technical pilot training.
4. '%eft/right brain" personality studies.
5. Subtle incapacitation.
6. Cognitive dissonance.
7. Psychosomatic studies.
8. Circadian studies.
9. Sleep research.
10. Behavior modification.
11. Personality types (how to deal with various types).
12. Family/marital and child-raising problems and techniques.
The research over the past 6 years supports the curriculum. This is, of course, a
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very brief overview, but does give the flavor of the program.
TECHNIQUES FOR CRM
The education/training should start in the classroom as it does for all professionals.
Research is very clear that one must grasp the principles of the subject matter for it to
be effective in the long range. The application of the education to the job will occur in a
number of ways. There must of course be a t_eap" made from education and theory to
the real world of flying. One must make this type of leap every day in all sorts of ways.
Pilot education has been overloaded in the technical flying area and largely lacking in
the behavioral science field. CRM must use techniques other than rote memory or '_eft
brain"-oriented tests and exercises. There is no cookbook answer or manual to cover
every possible accident scenario. Hence, the pilot must possess skills (and be taught
them) to identify human factors as they pertain to accidents. The pilot must be able to
determine the '_varning lights" of problem behavior as they occur with a fellow crew
member or himself. This is one of the ways we can avoid the human factor accident. A
crewmember who doesn't know how to assert himself/herself, for example, may die and
kill others in an accident due to never knowing how to send a strong 'q message." It has
happened. The crewmember who cannot recognize problem behavioral clues given by a
fellow pilot will also die due to a lack of education and sadly kills others too. These
human factor variables can be taught and must be taught in the classroom where
discussion is allowed in a non-threatening manner. This is the way the professional
psychiatrist, psychologist, social worker, or counselor is taught. There is no other proper
way to start the process correctly. Documented educational research is very clear in this
matter. The pilot then must take this classroom knowledge to the cockpit or home
situation and apply it there.
Statistically-valid and reliable tests should be used. Pilots are individuals who like
facts, data, and numbers in a logical sequence. They need proof. The tests give them
that type of feedback and open the door for personality/attitude change as needed.
LOFT [-type exercises] do not have to occur in the simulator. LOFT [-type
exercises] and simulator do not need to be synonymous. This is too narrow a
definition*. The simulator may be a natural follow-up to the classrooom education but
may not be necessary in all cases if on-going classroom education were utilized and
reinforced. If a pilot cannot make the educational leap from behavioral science education
in the classroom to the cockpit, then I would submit we have a potentially dangerous
pilot in regard to the human factor issue and accidents.
There may even be a danger to use of simulator situations and human behavior
because it reinforces the need for structure when in reality there is no cookbook
structured situation that applies in all scenarios. If too much t_spoon feeding" of the
material is done we may not be conditioning pilots to expect and be prepared for the
unexpected. Ideally though, the simulator is an excellent classroom if needed and the
*EDITORS' NOTE: The acronym LOFT (Line-Oriented Flight Training), as commonly used in the industry and
deecribed in Federal Aviation Administration Advisory Circular 120-35, refers to the use of a high-fidelity training simula-
tor to conduct S_mulated line operations for training purposes.
293
'h'ightexercises" are introduced.
This constant mentality of having to have structured training may be adding to the
problem at times. Dependence upon structure and the idea that if you do not have
written rules or structure you can't control or govern something may be fallacious. It
may also be why we have no mandated training even though the problem of t_ilot error"
and research in this area has been with us for the past 20 years. The research supports
recurrent classroom instruction to reinforce theories and principles and then utilize
personal experience discussions to heighten cognitive awareness of accident factors.
The group situation is most helpful in identifying and experiencing group interaction
variables. The pilot is in the group (15 to 20 members) and is educated on group
principles/theories. Being a member also allows experimenting with new behavior as well
as identification with the many individual issues discussed. The group feedback is most
helpful as it helps motivate and modify behavior much better than one-on-one situations.
Research on groups and their benefit in changing behaviors is extensive.
I would add that the training does not have to be expensive and involve simulators
at the onset. One well-chosen, educated, experienced teacher could deal with a student
group of 15-20. This would include didactic material and extensive discussion. The
second step would be the simulator or a reinforcement in the classroom within a year or
so, with follow-up material by mail. Material could also be mailed prior to a classroom
structure.
INTEGRATION INTO THE TOTAL TRAINING CURRICULUM
For maximum effectiveness the training should be reinforced at least yearly.
Research into the USAir program does show 5-year retainability of some portions of the
training, but much data asks for more follow-up--even for 6-month recurrent. The
research documents that some tangible and lasting behavior change did occur in the two-
or three-day period training time. We also have at least two documented experiences
where pilots have stated that the training saved two accidents and potentially 300 lives.
The National Training Laboratories (NTL) and others have been offering courses of
two- or three-day duration in a variety of formats for the past 30 years. They have
extensive research to document lasting change occurring during and after these sessions.
Remedial training should be utilized and has been in this program. It has not been
identified as such, but has been done. Ideally, the feeling is that "accident-prone" (or
pilots exhibiting pathology) should be taken off the line, given training, and a series of
neurological/psychological tests. If no progress is made then the individual should not be
allowed to fly again and kill him/herself and others.
EFFECTIVENESS OF CRM TRAINING
294
To beginwith, the initial reactionfrom the pilot after training shouldbepositive.
The target pilot group is an intelligent, aware population. The rationale for the training
should be acceptable to the individual who is also rational. A number of research issues
on follow-up have surfaced which pilots have identified as being key to long-term
effective programs.
The research extends back to 1980 for this program. Overall, our initial pre-class
survey indicates 2 percent of the pilots felt the training unnecessary. Post-class survey
instruments show a 4.75 rating (on a 1 to 5 scale with 5 being maximum) overall on all
subjects. The five-year follow-up survey data is still being processed. Some of the
information has been presented previously, and more will be presented when the data is
t_:runched." Initially the data does show a definite need for reinforcement through
recurrent training. It also shows an identified need for some type of training to be done
with family members, spouses, and other employees, as well as accident/incident/hijack
victims. It does show more retainability of the subject matter than expected.
What follows is a list of clinical issues that needs to be considered in any CRM
program. I have been involved in the instructional aspect, as well as practical application
on the clinical side while a US Army Medical Department Officer in Vietnam flying
"dustoff." My research dates back to 1970.
CLINICAL ISSUES IN PILOT HUMAN FACTOR TRAINING
The following issues are presented in a smorgasbord-type format to identify them as
keys to an effective CRM program. I am making an educated judgment based on
research that the pilot who is most likely to have an accident can be identified with a
degree of certainty. That pilot may never have an accident due to never being placed in
a situation where all the variables lead to an accident situation. However at some time
the regression to the mean statistical theory may apply. My research indicates the
problem pilot can and should be identified through standardized psychological and
physiological tests, peer review, and past incidents.
You change behavior through: 1) behavior therapies; 2) cognitive insight; and 3)
psychoanalytic techniques.
Pilots who exhibit excessive insistent demands on others are exhibiting
neurotic/distorted behavior initiated by extreme insecurity and are exhibiting '_varning
lights" that should be heeded. Many pilots prefer to remain where they are and are not
interested in altering behavior except in times of crisis or stress.
The pilot can be obsessional where anxiety/distress comes from unrealizable
demands that a person be perfect and beyond human limitations. The recognition of
weakness and fallibility produces anxiety, which may lead that person to seek help. This
may be brought about by cognitive awareness. It is tough for a pilot (problem pilot) to
change because some aspects of their life are beyond their conscious control and
influence. The group classroom experience provides intellectual/emotional insight. There
is a need to interrupt impulsive, destructive behavior and correct some confusion. The
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program must give the potential problem pilot some insight which may cause change to
Occur.
Pilots need to talk it out rather than act it out. They need to understand that there
are impediments (perhaps neurotic obstacles) in their living. They need to interrupt
impulsive destructive behavior. They must alter responses that are derived from
conditioning process.
I have seen many problem pilots who are very defensive on intellectual and
emotional issues and this makes them very confused. The confusion leads them to be
very rigid and overly stable in their behavior patterns. The captain-upgrade process from
right to left seat and the new computers in the cockpit are two examples. Another prime
example is the introducing of behavioral science information into pilot training. There is
a need to understand and grasp factors such as:
o How and why a person came to be that way.
o How the present way is maladaptive and unsatisfactory.
o How to alter without giving up valid goals/ideals.
The training program must identify many of these issues as there is no certainty
they will be brought out in any other way. Most pilots will not seek psychiatric help. We
cannot wait for ideal circumstances because they may never occur. We do have a certain
number of pilots flying who in many cases have been identified by peers and others who
are just "accidents waiting to happen." A program should help identify those individuals.
If a person's capacity for decisive action is interfered with by compulsive need to
behave otherwise, then it may take much persuasion and/or encouragement to change.
Many potential problem pilots employ intellectualizing, philosophizing, and conceptual
thinking (not specific) to defeat understanding. It is tough to focus on concrete issues
when a person's defense insists on generalizations, or when they are concrete to such a
degree as to destroy the value of the observation. We must overcome compulsion that is
of such rigid resolve and teach some type of abandon of resolve so that a person can
behave in some random, unplanned fashion to avoid the accident which will also come in
some random unplanned manner. The training must present a view of a person's
behavior and its consequences. The person has more freedom to explore different or more
useful patterns of reacting only when he/she recognizes rigid patterns are not necessary
and may cause accidents.
At times, the pilot world is one of excesses of a compulsive power-oriented, activity-
dominated culture/system. The person in this system feels he can do anything, succeed
at anything if only one wishes, and the possibility of achievement and fulfillment is
limited only by one's desires and capacity for work. Insufficient account is taken of
physiological and existential barriers and limits to man's capabilities and man's
mortality. This might be especially true when applied to aging and its physiological
accompaniments--especially for an older pilot who has no other options than flying. At
times, the pilot must be able to remove himself from doing and producing. This will
divest him from the compulsive need to perform all the time especially and importantly
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if this is dysfunctional behavior in the cockpit.
Pilot morale affects all aspects of his/her functioning. Feeling down for whatever
reason (bad check-ride) may lead to apathy and other dysphoric emotions and then on
to low self-confidence. A program should try to create and maintain a helping
relationship characterized by respect, interest, understanding, tact, maturity, and firm
belief and ability to help that troubled pilot and teach other pilots to be aware of the
danger signals (warning lights of dysfunctional behavior). The program should offer:
o Suggestions (persuasion)
o Encouragement of open communication, self-scrutiny and honesty
o Interpretations of 'hnconscious material" such as self-defeating behavior
o Examples of maturity such as the ability, capacity and willingness to profit
from experience
There is no one way specific behavior change takes place but rather a number of
ways and contexts in which it is facilitated. The CRM program must teach this fact
and include some examples of various programs. It should also be stressed that there are
formal and informal treatment methods.
There are seasons for everything in life and pilots need to understand this, via
perhaps, a lesson in Erikson's eight stages of life. We want to encourage different
outlooks on themselves, others, and the surrounding world. This tends to help one cope
better with a variety of personal and social problems that arise at home and in the
cockpit. This allows one to be more 'Mn-upsettable" when confronted with a new set of
troublesome conditions in either setting. Then when the _:atastrophes u occur, they do
not "awfulize," whine, or grandiosely command in a negative way.
It must be recognized that philosophic or cognitive change remains a prerequisite to
basic personality change. This too must be kept in mind in CRM program design.
Behavioral change, then, partly and significantly depends on realization that one can
learn new ways. Without this cognitive awareness an enormous degree of resistance and
inertia tends to occur and may lead to the accident. Self-assessment tests help through
cognitive review of a number of different areas that fit in with stress and/or personality
disorder. Conceptions and misconceptions are learned and hence, can be unlearned.
The above thoughts are gathered from clinical experience with pilots over the past
l0 years. 1 feel they should have some bearing on curriculum design in an effort to
prevent unnecessary human behavior which leads to accidents and loss of life. These
thoughts and ideas are by no means completely discussed. They have been a factor in
USAir CRM program design.
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MILITARY APPLICATIONS OF CRM*
Working Group VI
Col. Timothy tt. Hatch, Chair
David tt. Nelson. Vice-Chair
INTRODUCTION
The objective of the working group on Military Applications of Cockpit Resource
Management (ClaM) Training was to examine currcmt Ct{M training concepts and their
applicability to the military environment. It is _etl known that the military
environment presents unique challenges that must be addressed. Among the challenges
are the interaction of the military rank structure and the flight deck command structure
(uhich are often independent), officer-enlisted relationships, operational differences (e.g.
tactical operations), crew experience levels, high crew-turnover rates, differing crew
lifestyles arid duties, scheduling irregularities, long crew-duty days, customs and
courtesies, mission purpose and endemic problems to include command pressures_
inadequate support, job satisfaction and salary. The task of the working group was to
develop recommelJdalions addressillg specific military needs. Areas considered were
curriculum developlilent. CRM training techniques, effecliveness of CRM training and
integration of CI{XI _raining into the total t.raining currictllum. As these areas were
considered, the group made an on-going assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of
the current ('t{Xl training when applied to the special needs and characteristics of
military operations. The group was well qualified lo fulfill its intended purpose. It
consisted of a good blend of military and civilian_ different branches of service (Army
and Air Force). nlajor air commands (MAC, SAC, and A'I'C) and levels of responsibility
(ranging fronl headquarlers I:SAt:" level Io unil level). This report will discuss the what
and how of liiili_arv ('I;_M Iraining a11(t ('(include uilll recommendations on CRM
training for nlililar,, ()p(.rati(ms.
DISCUSSION
Opening discussion centered on MAC's position and philosophy concerning CRM
training. This discussion served as an education and reinforcement about one military
application of CI{M pri,ciples. Before proceeding to the chore at hand to determine the
what and how of military CRM training, the group discussed the difference between
military and civilian environments. All differences listed in the introduction of this
report were discussed and agreement was reached that the differences must be dealt with
in the military's CRM training.
* This is an expar_,ted v_,rs]¢_1_ e>f the oral report which appeared _n p, ;!41.
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Essential Elements of Military CRM Training
The key term in generating the essential elements of an o[)timum military (',]IM
training syllabus is resource management. The term resource management is defined as
using all resources to bring about safe airplane operations with resources used in the
broadest sense to mean that, both external and internal to the cockpit. An additional
key factor is that the training must be crew-oriented dealing with all members of the
crew, not just the pilots. The global goals of the training should satisfy command
demands and maximize safety. Goals are a joint responsibility requiring a coordinated
effort. Objectives to satisfy these goals must focus on the often-cited management skills.
These skills deal with leadership, followership, comrmlnication, problem solving and
stress management. The crew's abilities to function as a team and maintain situational
awareness are also critical elements of the program.
"l'h¢ _ overall training objective is to make all crewmembers aware of proper behavior.
This awareness is developed in two ways. First, a model for proper behavior is created
and presented. Second, improper behavior must be demonstrated. Next, the program
must leach small group dynamics to include leadership, followship, communication skills
and lhe s5nergy of good team play. All crewmembers must become aware that they do
tJ<_t _)p('rat+' in a vacuum and that they must use their individual talents to form a
functioning crew unit. Crew coordination to include problem solving, decision making,
task a_++igtlt_l¢,nt aM] conflict resolution plays a significant role in developing proper
sit tl_:_t i()H_+t] _iv,,,etrerleSmS.
The lnilitary CtlM training must be critiqued but not graded. It is important for
the crew to share feedback (both good and bad) at the end of training. The goal of this
critique is to reinforce the good and correct the bad.
Techniques for Military CRM Training
The group objective concerning the 'Now to" of militar\ CICM training was to reach
th<, needed balance between techniques that supply infi_rmatiut_ and those techniques
I ILat provide experience regarding the trainees own behavior when working with others
in the cockpit. The driving principles are: make the training military-specific tailored to
t}_<, t rainee's unit mission; ensure that instructors are properl3 selected, well-trained and
tltoti_ated t,o purpose; and that the training progran_ ccmtent is consistent with
command philosophy. The training must accomplish three things. First, the trainee
must be motivated, provided a conceptual framework and involved in the training.
Second, the trainee's knowledge base must be built. This base must include an
understanding of the CRM process and the establishment of a common language. Third,
CRM skills rnust be acquired and retained. The objective here is the optimum use of all
cockpit resources. This process must enhance existing skills, build new skills and retain
and reinflJrce skills. Techniques should include classroom instruction, role playing,
interpersonal relationships, group problem solving, video tape feedback and LOFT type
scenarios. The user must be involved in military CRM training to ensure that the
training is tailored to needs. Three steps must be performed early in training program.
The steps are: first, conduct a user critical requirements analysis. Second, conduct a
user revi+,_. Third, conduct user acceptance testing. Wh<+n these steps are properly
cor_duct¢,d, user involvement is ensured.
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Implementation of Military ('RYI 7'ramm 9
I'lanrfing for (:RM training illq)lenwntati(m is ('riti('al. The plan must be well
l}loughl out an(] existing training forunls should be used to the maximum extent
possible. Because this training is not a "one time shot", close attention must be given to
reinfor('erllmlt training. Equally important is the integralion of CRM training into the
total training curriculum. Military CRM training should begin very early in the
crewnlcmber's training. The recommended beginning point is at the end of UPT, UNT,
basic flighl engineer school, etc. An introduclory seminar would probably fill the bill of
an irltroduction to (;llM training. Next, each major air command should teach the
initial (,']{M course at their formal schools (CCTS). The C.I{M course should be taught
at or near the conclusion of the formal transition course. To provide reinforcement,
forJr_al {:}{.M training should be integrated as a part of annual simulator training.
.kddilionally. for lhose who conduct semi-annual simulator training (such as MAC),
('t_\l l raining should be irw]uded. When possible, reinforcenwnt should be conducted
u_ing vide() lapv and reading materials on at least a monthly basis. In summary, CRM
t rail_illg should be conducted as part of initial training and then reinforced at every
oplmr*ul_ily using available forums. Simulators and cockpit procedures and trainers (if
_vail+_ble) are a must. CRM training sessions should be recorded on video tape to be
_Jsed ilJ self-crilique.
t:'ff, cti+'e,e.,'._ of Militory CRM Trainin9
\Vhile not within the specific group charter, the group felt that some statements on
(.ffect iv('ness would be appropriate. Just as with civilian CRM training, there is little to
go on to determine the effectiveness of military CRM training. MAC has the only Air
Force l)rogranl in existence, and the program results look good. However, the data are
limiled and certainly inconclusive. A real need exists for a data base benchmark so that
effectiveness can be measured. A neutral agency' such as NASA is a prime contender to
develop such a data base. Until better means are (t(wised. each using organization
should evaluate their own program to determinu if the desired results are achieved. All
should be aware that barriers to effective CRM do exist. Among these barriers are: the
"not inveNt(,d here syndrome," resistance to change, a t)vli(,f 1hat such training already
exists, and inadequate command support. Our conclusi(,n is that military CRM training
will contribute to effective team performance thereby enhancing safe, orderly, and
expeditious mission accomplishment to the extent that, such training is user sensitive and
decidedly military.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The group voiced unanimous support for a strong and credible military CRM
training program that trains all aircrew members. The following recommendations are
offered concerning such a program.
o The entire military aviation community, must be educated on the benefits of
(',RM.
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o The CRM training must start in Air Training Command, continue in each
command formal school training and be reinforced at ]east annually as part of
simulator training.
o The program must be decidedly military and sensitive to all military
requirements.
o The users must be involved in the training program development to ensure
all unique requirements are met.
o Continual command support for the training is a must.
o Trainees must be provided feedback from video tapes and self-critique.
Formal checkrides should be avoided.
No formal recommendations are offered on the %,hat and how" of the training
program. Because each program nnlst be tailored to user requirements, those areas
discussed earlier in this report should be used as guide}ines for program development.
In conclusion, each member of the working group expressed the value of this forum
and voiced hope and strong support for a tailored military CRM training program.
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